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In 1985, the new General Secretary of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union introduced two words to the global vocabulary Once only 
known to speakers of the Russian language, perestroika and glasnost 
have permeated the world s media, especially m Western Europe and the 
United States Today, they symbolize to many a chance that the Soviet Union 
may be changing its ways to better fit a western model of the world
Although many have claimed that Mr Gorbachev s reforms are only 
propaganda and that the true nature of the Soviet state will soon reappear, 
it has become extremely difficult to deny that perestroika* and glasnost 
have had, and will continue to have, a significant impact on all aspects of 
Soviet society Major restructuring has been undertaken within the Soviet 
system, including the governmental bureaucracy, agricultural programs, and 
industry It is too early to tell whether these reforms will succeed in bringing 
about a more competitive Soviet economy and a less objectionable internal 
policy, but it is already clear that it will be very difficult for the Soviets to put 
the genie back in the bottle
Perhaps the most significant change m the Soviet Union over the last 
three years has been the incredible increase in the amount of dissenting 
information Not only are people allowed to disagree with each other, but 
dissidents can now speak out against the state s policies with greater freedom 
Criticism has become so widespread that even Soviet defense policy has come 
under attack from external, civilian experts
Since 1986, Soviet press releases have reflected a growing consensus 
that the security policy of the Soviet Union is at least partly to blame for the 
state of world tensions Although this is nothing new to western analysts, 
who have been saying it since 1945, Soviet acknowledgment of that fact is 
remarkable It may result in a new Soviet military policy that could have a 
significant impact on NATO and the rest of the world Therefore, it is 
necessary to consider the potential outcomes of the defense policy debate m 
the Soviet Union and, especially, its effect on NATO planning and coherence
The Military and the Party—An Uneasy Alliance
Any close look at Soviet defense policy must pay attention first to the 
role of the military m the governing structure of the Soviet Union The 
Soviet military is an extremely powerful bloc within the Soviet Union 
Indeed, during the early part of Brezhnev s reign, the Soviet armed forces 
were given priority access to resources and people to ensure that they could 
provide for the security of the homeland Since that time, however, party 
relations with the military have slowly deteriorated While defense spending 
grew at 4 percent during the first half of the Brezhnev reign, by the late 1970s,
2it had fallen to only 2 percent, with almost no growth m funds for 
procurement1
During the early 1980s, under Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko, 
relationships between the party and the military did not improve There 
appeared to be a growing recognition among the party leadership that, in the 
recent past, the Soviet Umon made senous mistakes that contributed to 
international tensions and the American buildup of weapons Three issues 
had a particularly significant impact on the military thinking of Gorbachev 
and his predecessors The first was the deployment of SS-20s in Asia and 
Europe The political backlash that this policy created in the West led to the 
American deployment of Pershing II and Cruise Missiles, and a serious 
reduction in Soviet security Secondly, the quick intervention in 
Afghanistan was becoming a long, drawn-out affair by the early 1980s and was 
increasingly seen by Gorbachev as a poor decision Finally, there was the 
Soviet governments mishandling of the international furor that followed 
the shooting down of the Korean Airliner in 1983 2
All of this, along with the affair of Mathias Rust, has led to significant 
changes in the upper military-political ranks since Gorbachev assumed 
power These changes have resulted in the replacement of ten of the top 
sixteen deputy defense ministers, the chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, the 
heads of the Soviet Force Groups in Germany, Poland, and Hungary, and the 
commanders of the Moscow and Byelorussian military districts In addition, 
in 1987, Gorbachev placed a personal ally, Dmitri Yazov, m the position of 
Deputy Defense Minister and replaced the head of the Soviet Air Defense 
Forces 3 However, these changes have not significantly improved the 
relationship between the party and the military Nor are Gorbachev’s 
continuing reform policies likely to help to any great degree, for if they are to 
succeed, they will require heavy cuts m military spending
Economic Reform and the Military—Changing the Balance
Since his election to Party General Secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev has 
followed a policy of sweepmg economic reforms Decades of poor planning 
under his predecessors had resulted in a severe economic crisis As a result, 
[by] the fame Gorbachev became General Secretary, the Soviet superpower 
status was precariously balanced on a single leg military power 4 And even 
that power was being threatened by the growing technological gap between 
the Soviet Union and the Umted States Gorbachev, therefore, believed that 
rebuilding the basis of the Soviet Union s superpower status required a shift 
in emphasis to economic reform which, m turn, necessitated a re-evaluation 
of Soviet defense policy and its implications for defense resource 
requirements 5
3Western analysts have estimated that defense spending, while 
undergoing almost no growth over the past few years, still consumes 
upwards of 17 percent of the Soviet GNP—as compared to approximately 
6 percent in the Umted States—placing a very heavy burden on the Soviet 
economy It is widely recognized in the West that successful economic 
reform will require serious cutbacks in military spending 6 The major 
impediment to such cutbacks is the future resource commitments implied 
by threat assessments and requirements derived from traditional thinking 7 
Unless the Soviet government radically changes its security and threat 
assessments, defense resource spending will grow larger and larger with 
respect to civilian spending, and thus doom long-term economic reform
Economic constraints are not the only forces in the Soviet Union 
pushing toward a reassessment of security policy Since 1983, the Soviet 
Union has begun to realize that security cannot be achieved by any country 
alone in the modern world Mutual security has become the buzzword for 
those who believe that a unilateral military buildup actually reduces a 
country s security by causing its enemies to engage in similar military 
expansion An extended arms race also reduces a country s security by 
decreasing its perceived trustworthiness and this, m its turn, feeds 
international tensions
Before the mid-1960s, Soviet security policy was based on the belief that 
the possibility of a Third World war constituted the greatest threat The 
Soviets thought that such a war would escalate to an exchange of massive 
nuclear strikes Therefore, they attempted to equalize the strategic nuclear 
balance and to be prepared for a preemptive nuclear strike on the United 
States if war seemed imminent In the mid-'60s, however, Soviet strategists 
began to believe that a war between the superpowers might be contained at a 
conventional level and not involve nuclear strikes on the Soviet Union By 
adopting policies of no-first-use and blitzkrieg conventional strikes, Soviet 
defensive strategy was aimed at evicting US troops from the continent 
without inviting nuclear retaliation 8
This shift entailed a new military resource allocation mode that was 
much more consumptive than before First, it required the maintenance of a 
credible second-strike capability to deter nuclear attacks Second, it demanded 
Soviet ground and air forces in Europe to be superior to NATO forces 
Moreover, Soviet forces had to be postured offensively m order to be able to 
execute rapid strikes into Western Europe that would disrupt NATO s 
nuclear capabilities and perhaps even avert all nuclear escalation 9
Because of NATO s technological superiority and greater economic 
efficiency, this confrontational policy was difficult to maintain To 
compensate, the Soviets first turned to larger forces, but this option proved to 
be prohibitively expensive Further undermining the policy was the
4recognition that a superpower conflict could erupt outside of Europe, 
especially in the Middle East The Soviets now seem to think that regional 
conflicts with the United States can be contained and will not necessarily lead 
to a world war As a result, they have envisioned a new role for their troops 
in Europe Whereas, previously, these military forces had been poised to 
sweep through Western Europe, Soviet doctrine now emphasizes 
maintaining an impenetrable defense against NATO in the face of conflict 
elsewhere 10
"New” Thinking and "Old”—A Contrast m Ideology
Gorbachev has extended this line of security reasoning into what he 
has termed new thinking If the objective is defense, and not preemptive 
strikes, then numerically superior forces and offensive posturing are no 
longer necessary Hence, two of the central tenets of Gorbachev s new 
thinking are reasonable sufficiency and defensive defense New 
thinking, though, is far from accepted throughout the government or the 
military Despite major changes m leadership under Gorbachev, the military 
establishment is not enthusiastic about the new security concepts The 
military acknowledges that Soviet armed forces must help bear the burden of 
economic reform, but does not believe that Soviet security can be enhanced 
through political movements instead of military means This came to the 
forefront of the debate m the aftermath of the Intermediate-Range and 
Shorter-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty Soon after the signing, NATO 
officials began discussing the modernization of the short-range LANCE 
missile to compensate for the loss of the INF forces In response, Soviet 
military officials commented that not only had the Soviet Union removed 
more missiles under INF but also, after LANCE, modernization would be 
faced with the same threat as before
Many of the conflicts between new ' and old thinkers are highly 
ideological m nature Old thinkers, for example, are more skeptical of 
Western intentions, are more likely to believe that the Soviet state cannot be 
threatening because it is a socialist state, and believe that strict parity is the 
minimum requirement for security What follows is a short description of 
most of the tenets of Gorbachev s new thinking and the arguments posed 
against it by traditional Soviet analysts This is followed by a much longer 
analysis of two particularly important ideas, reasonable sufficiency and 
’defensive defense
The first, and probably least debated, tenet of the ’ new thinking is the 
inclusion of war prevention m official Soviet military doctrine For the most 
part, this is simply an official admission of something that has been agreed 
upon for several years, namely, that war is not inevitable between capitalists 
and socialists, and that its prevention is in the best interests of the Soviet
5Union However, differences arise with respect to the strategies used to 
prevent war 11
New thinkers emphasize the importance of inadvertent nuclear war 
versus deliberate war This comes from an ideological shift among the new 
thinkers They now believe that nuclear war cannot be considered a rational 
means for seeking political goals—even for capitalist states 12 ' Old" 
thinkers, however, still harbor ill ideological feelings about what capitalists 
will use as rational extensions of political actions They believe that the 
western nations are still willing to use nuclear forces as a rational instrument 
of war
New’ thinkers believe that, in an era of mutual security, political 
methods of guaranteeing security are far superior to military means In fact, 
Gorbachev has even posited that political means may very well provide the 
only way to solve Soviet security problems New thinkers, for example, 
argue that the INF Treaty entirely removed the threat that limited nuclear 
war in Europe could reach Soviet soil, and thus significantly enhanced Soviet 
security In addition, they would argue that negotiating away SDI as a threat 
is preferable to matching it Security to the new thinkers is not a zero-sum 
game Instead, political agreements can enhance the security of both nations 
Old thinkers, m contrast, tend to see security only in their neighbors 
insecurity and their own military capabilities
Important theoretical components of the current Soviet security debate, 
mutual security, the threat of inadvertent war, and war prevention, are likely 
to have only an indirect impact on NATO policy, namely through their 
contributions to two other components, reasonable sufficiency and 
defensive defense These components are among the most hotly contested 
issues in the Soviet security debate, and have the potential to significantly 
change Soviet arms control positions and force structures in Eastern Europe 
Of course, neither side in the debate believes that Soviet armed forces should 
be insufficient or offensive, but there is disagreement on what sufficiency and 
defensiveness entail The old thinkers believe that the capitalist forces of 
the West are prepared to strike deep into Soviet territory, and that Soviet 
security can only be fully ensured when all external sources of threat have 
been removed Thus, to old thinkers, sufficiency of forces entails superior 
ground forces capable of repelling any attack and a defensive strategy based on 
a preemptive blitzkrieg of Western Europe
New ' thinkers, in contrast, believe that mutual security can be 
maintained between a capitalist West and a socialist East They also believe 
that regional superpower conflicts can be contained without escalating to a 
world war Thus, new thinkers are more inclined to believe that sufficiency 
entails forces that are postured defensively so as to appear less threatening to 
the West As this option requires smaller force levels, it is amenable to
6reductions in military expenditures, undoubtedly one of the reasons 
Gorbachev supports it
The debate over reasonable sufficiency is not just a quarrel between 
old and new over the definition of sufficiency It also embodies a far greater 
debate over what has determined sufficiency in the past and what will 
determine sufficiency m the future Some Soviet writers suggest that 
previous Soviet security thmking has been predicated on reaching exact parity 
with NATO forces by mimicking western defense efforts They believe that a 
policy of reasonable sufficiency would establish internal defense 
requirements and expend resources only to match those defense needs Other 
Soviet writers, however, believe that the Soviet Union s previous defense 
expenditures were based on internally set requirements, and that a policy of 
maintaining parity with NATO forces would come closer to reasonable 
sufficiency ' 13
Defensive defense/ the other hotly contested issue of the Soviet 
secunty debate, runs into definitional problems as well Nearly all Soviet 
writers feel that Soviet forces should be defensive, but they disagree about 
what that means 'New ' thinkers believe that defensive forces are those 
required to stop an attack, hold against further penetration of Warsaw Pact 
territory, and then push enemy forces back to the border 14 Operationally, 
this would result in a doctrine not unlike that of NATO forces in Western 
Europe Gorbachev said in February 1987, It is important, in our view, while 
lowering the level of military confrontation, to carry through such measures 
as would make it possible to lessen, or better still, altogether exclude the 
possibility of surprise attack He continued, The most dangerous kinds of 
offensive weapons must be removed from the zone of contact 15
Old thinkers, however, do not agree that Soviet forces m Europe 
should be restructured They point to four arguments against such defensive 
thinking First, it is difficult to distinguish offensive weapons from defensive 
weapons unless they are actually used in combat For example, anti-tank 
weapons are generally described as defensive weapons against tanks, but they 
are equally as effective when used by an invading force Second, it is very 
difficult to win a war without carrying it to the enemy's territory NATO has 
advanced this tactic itself with its Follow On Forces Attack, aimed at 
striking deep into Eastern Europe to remove second and third echelon forces 
Third, old ' thinkers claim that military history demonstrates the advantages 
of preemptive strategies over static defenses Finally, they argue that socialist 
forces cannot be threatening to opponents no matter how they are deployed 
because socialist states would only use their forces m defense 16
For the most part, the opposition to new thinking on military 
doctrine comes from the military bureaucracy According to Marshall 
Akhromeev, most of the current problems exist because NATO is preparing
7for an extended conventional war using new systems of armaments that will 
begin with a massive surprise attack and be swiftly extended throughout the 
depth of Soviet territory and that of its allies 17 General Gribkov agrees and 
argues that Warsaw Pact forces are retaliatory in nature and possess only 
enough arms to defend themselves against and rebuff a potential aggressor 18
To suggest, however, that the military is opposed to all new thinking 
and that civilian analysts are all new ' thinkers is to oversimplify the 
situation Certainly, a large part of the military establishment is hesitant 
about new thinking, but many of the so-called civilian advisers are 
retired military officers, and even some active members are calling for 
reasonable sufficiency and defensive defense Moreover, the hard core 
civilian conservatives remaining within the government from the Brezhnev 
years are very reluctant to support the new thinking, and a few actively 
oppose it on military matters
A study by R Hyland Phillips and Jeffrey Sands examined recent Soviet 
writings by both military and civilian analysts and their responses to the 
issues of new ' thinking The authors found that nearly all Soviet writers 
studied called for cuts in military forces However, to the question of whether 
those cuts should be tied to cuts by the Western allies, approximately one- 
third of the civilian but none of the military analysts called for possible 
unilateral cuts On the issue of a defensive military doctrine, the authors 
found that the military analysts were split roughly in half, while the civilian 
authors were all m favor of less offensive operational strategy Phillips and 
Sands concluded that there was general agreement with the broad terms of 
the first question, but that as the questions became more detailed, the 
responses are more predictable on the basis of affiliation Still, there were 
members of the military willing to support some of the ideas of ’new 
thinking at the specific level19
Even in Marshall Akhromeevs statements, elements of new 
thinking are not contradicted, although he does not explicitly support them 
He agrees that neither East nor West should have the capacity to engage in 
surprise attacks or large offensive maneuvers He has also accepted the 
position that the current arms race threatens to reach a point where strategic 
parity no longer reinforces deterrence 20
Although Soviet security policy is of central importance to his 
economic and political reforms, Gorbachev has yet to concretely define his 
use of the terms reasonable sufficiency and defensive defense As a 
result, the debate has not come to a climax It is quite possible, however, that 
something may happen sooner rather than later, for Gorbachev is coming 
under increasing pressure to implement even more drastic economic 
reforms Moreover, the rapid pace of superpower arms negotiations gives 
him the opportunity to implement new thinking
8The State of the Alliances— Effects of New Thinking
However, old thinkers in the United States question the value of 
those negotiations They still see the Soviets as they saw them m 1945—as 
dangerous aggressors bent on taking over the world Gorbachev and his 
new thinking are viewed as propaganda tools to coax NATO into 
calamitous treaties They believe the Soviets will show their true colors soon 
enough Even if Gorbachev is serious and succeeds m changing the Soviet 
positions to 'reasonable sufficiency and ' defensive defense, ' they argue, 
NATO can benefit most by not changing its present course
The current state of NATO s internal relations gives reason to doubt 
the adequacy of the conservatives views Policies that reduce Soviet forces in 
Eastern Europe and make their posture less threatening would probably result 
in pressures within NATO for comparable reductions In addition, by 
refusing to participate m an active attempt to enhance mutual security, the 
United States would reduce the likelihood that superpower relations would 
outgrow the cold war in the near future
Furthermore, even though the numbers of troops in Europe obviously 
favor the Soviet Union, many experts argue that, in fact, rough parity exists 
between the two conventional forces When factors such as technological 
superiority, firepower concentration, and the training, morale, readiness, and 
reliability of troops are taken into consideration, NATO forces compare quite 
well with their Warsaw Pact counterparts Moreover, recent problems, most 
notably with Cruise and Pershing II missile deployment, have shown that 
alliance cohesion can still be maintained, even in the face of large anti- 
alliance public opinion movements
On the other hand, it is also obvious that several issues threaten to tear 
the alliance more than ever apart In the wake of the INF agreement, the 
West German public and government increasingly see themselves as the 
objects of singularization by default within NATO Because the 
intermediate-range forces have been removed, the two German states would 
have to bear the brunt of the nuclear attack if a nuclear war were to be fought 
in Europe The West Germans argue that the risk is no longer shared equally 
within NATO To equalize the risk, they advocate negotiating a third zero 
and removing all short-range nuclear forces 21
However, NATO s policy of extended deterrence has always relied 
upon short- and intermediate-range nuclear forces m Europe to provide a 
link m the escalation ladder between conventional and strategic forces In 
addition, the United States argues that, because of overwhelming Soviet 
troop numbers, it will not leave its troops in Europe without immediate
9nuclear defenses Especially in view of the United States budget deficit and 
military cuts which threaten to lower the number of United States troops in 
Europe, the NATO governments are concerned that the United States 
strategic nuclear forces on which extended deterrence is based may become 
decoupled from the defense of Europe As demographic trends m the United 
States and West Germany threaten further the ability of these two states to 
field current levels of troops, these pressures can only grow
NATO is not the only alliance that is currently facing severe tests The 
Warsaw Pact is experiencing its own set of problems Poor training and troop 
morale, particularly among non-Soviet troops, has yielded low levels of troop 
reliability during military operations The Warsaw Pact is also suffering from 
its own burdensharing disputes Finally, serious reductions of Soviet troop 
numbers in Eastern Europe would likely fuel an increase in overt ethnic and 
anti-Soviet tensions within the Warsaw Pact This is especially relevant 
because of Gorbachev s perestroika and glasnost policies which have already 
prompted numerous and increasingly widespread calls for political freedom 
in Eastern Europe Finally, the Warsaw Pact economies are in very bad shape 
Even the East Germans face severe economic problems Serious changes will 
be necessary if the nations of Eastern Europe are to rebuild their economies 22
Given the state of potential disarray in which both alliances find 
themselves, NATO and the Warsaw Pact must be very careful in attempts to 
implement Gorbachev's new security thinking through conventional arms 
control The success Gorbachev has in persuading the Soviet government to 
adopt his new thinking will certainly influence both alliances strongly, as will 
NATO s responses to it Should Gorbachev fail to convince his government 
of the worthiness of reasonable sufficiency and defensive defense, his 
economic reforms are likely to fail as well Gorbachev cannot bring about the 
latter under the shadow of the huge costs of the current arms race Moreover, 
the success of his economic reforms will play a major role in keeping him in 
power Public outrage, ethnic tension, and conservative backlash all threaten 
to hasten his doom if his economic reforms fail
Initially, a conservative backlash in the Soviet Union and a return to 
old thinking in security policy would probably favor NATO The renewed 
Soviet threat would result in a revived cold war, with little or no arms 
control negotiations occurring With this type of a reversal in Soviet 
positions, NATO would likely gam significant public opinion windfalls for 
force modernizations and experience renewed alliance cohesion 23 Longer 
term analysis, however, suggests that NATO s security would be reduced 
under these conditions because of the renewed superpower tensions Both 
powers would be caught m a spiralling arms race, probably even m space The 
result would most likely lead to a confrontation, especially given NATO s 
technological superiority and the Soviet inability to maintain ’ adequate 
numerical superiority
10
Of far greater interest to the United States are the possibilities that 
could unfold if Gorbachev is able to convince the Soviet government and 
military that lower force levels and a defensive posture would enhance 
Soviet security by reducing the external threat Presently, it seems likely that 
he will succeed—given his past successes in implementing radical departures 
from traditional Soviet policy The results of such a situation could be 
extremely beneficial to the entire world, but they could also lead to 
catastrophe for NATO if met unprepared
Gorbachev’s proposals for conventional arms control have already had 
dramatic effects in Western Europe Cold warriors in the West argue that his 
motives are to reduce the cohesion of NATO by turning public opinion 
against the governments and the governments against each other 24 This 
threat to NATO's cohesion and security is very real, as evidenced by the 
recent bickering following the INF treaty and the genuinely positive image 
West Europeans have of Gorbachev He is the first Soviet leader to have 
shown such an uncanny ability to capture their hearts Indeed, one quarter 
of the public in four major allied countries attribute Gorbachev s interest in 
arms control to altruism 25 Unilateral moves by the Soviets to reduce their 
forces m Eastern Europe, or arms control proposals for major asymmetric 
reductions would very likely cause public opinion to swing even more to 
Gorbachev s side If the Umted States were to engage m a policy of opposing 
Gorbachev’s reforms, it would only further erode NATO s stability 26
Gorbachev may be the first Soviet leader to recognize that further 
NATO nuclear disarmament will require profound changes m the quantity 
and posturing of Soviet conventional forces Unfortunately, even though 
Gorbachev may convince his government of the benefits of reasonable 
sufficiency and defensive defense, the twin threats of ethnic unrest and 
the failure of economic reforms force Gorbachev to both reduce defense 
spending and improve relations with the West immediately Without 
NATO support m the near future for conventional arms reductions, the 
Soviet government may grow more skeptical of Gorbachev s military reform 
proposals Furthermore, rising popular expectations may fuel unrest in the 
Eastern Bloc and, consequently, weaken the Soviets willingness to scale 
down their military presence
NATO s concerns are thus two-fold First, the pace and results of arms 
control agreements must not result m an unfavorable military position in 
Europe Nor should the negotiations reduce NATO cohesion by polarizing 
public opinion Hence the negotiations must be rapid enough to satisfy those 
who see an opportunity to improve East-West relations, but they must not be 
so fast that NATO s security is impaired militarily Second, NATO should 
take care that the pace of arms control negotiations does not reduce 
Gorbachev s ability to implement constructive changes in the Soviet
11
government and military In all, it will require a delicate balancing act, but by 
actively testing Soviet intentions and maintaining control over the arms 
control agenda, NATO has a precious chance to help reduce world tensions
Proposals for Change
NATO should not simply take Gorbachev s word that he wants arms 
reductions m the conventional arena Instead, it should act first and propose 
a set of asymmetric force reductions that favor NATO security One possible 
scenario is for NATO to include air forces in the conventional arms 
reductions Such an addition is highly desirable to the Soviet Union and 
could lead to a breakthrough m which Soviet air and armor forces could be 
brought into rough numerical parity with those of NATO at lower than 
current levels This would be beneficial to both sides, but, as importantly, it 
would give the initiative back to NATO If the Soviet Union agrees, 
significant steps towards conventional stability will have been reached, if not, 
NATO, instead of the Soviet Union, gams significant public opinion 
windfalls
Another area in which NATO could generate significant gams in 
stability is that of battlefield nuclear weapons A proposal to eliminate NATO 
tactical nuclear forces in exchange for an elimination of those of the Soviets 
and deep reductions m Soviet armor would significantly enhance stability in 
Europe 27 Other potential negotiating positions include postponements of 
conventional and nuclear modernization plans and partial reductions in 
tactical nucluear forces Proposals such as these would give NATO the 
advantage of control over the pace of negotiations, while preserving NATO s 
military security
These proposals aim directly at ' reasonable sufficiency They seek to 
define it according to NATO interests as rough panty in conventional forces 
at lower levels Similar negotiating ideas should aim at defining defensive 
defense in a way that best enhances NATO security Confidence building 
measures could comprise a significant part of an opening proposal Such 
measures bolster security without reducing forces, thus providing both an 
opportunity to test Soviet intentions and an insurance against deception If 
successful, negotiations would add to the continuing growth of inter-alliance 
trust generated by INF and the Stockholm agreement on confidence building 
measures The proposal could also include plans to remove large numbers of 
offensive weapons, not necessarily from the theatre, but from the front lines 
A plan to asymmetrically remove battlefield nuclear weapons and mam battle 
tanks from the front could be followed by a plan to eliminate those units later 
on These plans would increase mutual security by decreasing the threat of 
surprise attack They would generate positive public support for 
governments on both sides And finally, as trust grows and forces are
12
eliminated, substantial financial savings can be achieved In fact, conferences 
on both sides have already suggested such demilitarized zones as possible 
elements of force restructuring that could significantly contribute to mutual 
confidence 28
To be sure, conventional arms reduction will not be an easy task to 
accomplish in todays world, but it is one that the West must attempt to 
achieve There is no reason why arms reduction cannot succeed if both sides 
believe it to be beneficial to their security The Soviet Union has to be willing 
to make deep cuts in several areas of ground based conventional forces, 
including armor, infantry, and artillery In addition, the Soviets must be 
willing to reduce the numbers of aircraft they maintain m Europe In 
response, NATO will need to drastically reduce its air forces and to agree to an 
elimination of all battlefield nuclear weapons And NATO will have to 
forego some conventional force modernizations in exchange for stability at 
lower force levels These are difficult issues to resolve, but the opportunity 
exists to finally bring a mutual security regime to Europe with the potential 
of eliminating forty-five years of tension
Unfortunately, without a strong NATO initiative to achieve 
reductions, they are unlikely to take place In addition to Gorbachev s 
internal problems, Western public opinion poses a major threat to 
negotiations Public reaction to Gorbachev s proposals has become 
increasingly strong, especially in West Germany The German government 
has reacted more favorably to Gorbachev in the face of this pressure As a 
result, other governments have begun to fear that Gorbachevs initiatives are 
simply ploys to mate German neutrality This has produced strong tensions 
within the alliance that can only be rectified by a strong NATO initiative on 
conventional arms control Such a move would satisfy German desires for 
more interaction while assuring the others of NATO s stability and 
cohesiveness
Verification will be next to impossible without high levels of intrusion 
on both sides, and initial data counts may once again plague the negotiations 
The last time the world saw what was termed as detente was in the 1970s, 
and the result was one of the most extensive military buildups in postwar ' 
history by both superpowers, and increasingly high world tensions by the late 
1970s and early 1980s The collapse of detente was blamed on the West 
hoping for too much change too fast, and on the Soviet Union changing too 
little too late This time, it may well be that detente will collapse because the 
United States fails to credit the Soviet Union enough, and Gorbachevs hopes 
for his country and the world are too high
Whether or not the Soviet debate on security policy is deaded in favor 
of Gorbachev or the military, its impacts are likely to be felt throughout the 
Soviet Unioni and the world It may very well have begun as an attempt to
13
generate capital for Gorbachev s ailing economic reforms, but it certainly has 
not ended there Instead, it has become one of the world s hottest issues The 
radical changes in the Soviet Union s policies and views of the world 
required by new thinking have finally brought its leader into public favor in 
the West, a major accomplishment and a major step m the process of 
reintegrating the two sides in a global community Mr Gorbachev went part 
way when he said that the problem of nuclear war must transcend class 
struggle If NATO accepts his challenge, and a major reduction of forces and 
tensions in Europe results, the world will have gone a long way towards 
eliminating the threat of nuclear annihilation
14
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